By: Laksamana Sukardi
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(Minister of State Owned Enterprises 1999-2004; Co-founder of Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan; Former banker and Member of Parliament)
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Introduction
The 1998 Reform Movement (Reformasi) marked a turning point in Indonesia’s political history, ending more than three decades of authoritarian rule. Its initial goals were noble: restoring citizens’ political rights, dismantling authoritarian controls, and building institutions to safeguard democracy. New political parties were legalized, constitutional amendments were enacted, and powerful institutions such as the Constitutional Court and the Corruption Eradication Commission were established.
However, after twenty-five years, the reform legacy reveals serious structural weaknesses. What was envisioned as a democratic breakthrough has, paradoxically, entrenched new forms of authoritarianism within political parties themselves. This essay argues that the Reform Movement committed a foundational error by granting political parties unchecked power—a “blank check”—without ensuring accountability or structural safeguards.
From Liberation to Party Monopoly
The psychological atmosphere in 1998 was dominated by the euphoria of reclaiming political rights long denied. For three decades, only three parties existed, all controlled by the state: Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), and the United Development Party (PPP). Reformasi thus sought to liberate political expression, creating space for new parties to flourish.
Yet this liberation also meant that political parties became the sole gatekeepers of democratic participation. They monopolized candidate selection, from the presidency down to local legislatures. Citizens were reduced to choosing from pre-screened options determined by party elites. Over time, this entrenched the dominance of party chairmen, who wielded disproportionate influence over governance.
The Absolute Power of Party Leaders
Indonesia’s constitutional design further enhanced the role of political parties. Parliament (DPR) became the central node for selecting not only executive officials but also strategic state appointments, from Supreme Court judges to the heads of Bank Indonesia, the Financial Services Authority, the State Audit Board, the Armed Forces, and the Police.
As parliamentary factions are controlled by party chairmen, the authority to appoint, legislate, allocate budgets, and oversee implementation effectively rests in the hands of a few individuals. This creates what can be described as a closed-loop of power: those who choose the officials are the same ones who make the rules, provide the funds, and supervise their execution. Crucially, accountability is absent.
Undemocratic Pillars of Democracy
The result is a political structure where the so-called “pillars of democracy” are themselves undemocratic. Party leadership has evolved into a kind of franchise of power, often described colloquially as wani piro?—a transactional logic of “how much is it worth?” Intra-party democracy is virtually absent; many party leaders refuse to relinquish power and instead pass leadership positions to family members, perpetuating dynastic control.
Two decades ago, I warned in my book “Reforming Political Parties: More Important Than Elections” that this trajectory would block channels of public aspiration. That warning has materialized. The people’s voices are increasingly disconnected from their representatives, producing a widening gulf between society and its supposed leaders.
Recent satirical reflections capture this irony: “Light above, darkness below” and “Entrepreneurs become rulers, rulers become entrepreneurs.” These metaphors underscore the fusion of political and economic power, further eroding public trust.
The Consequences of Structural Errors
The Reform Movement’s fundamental mistake lies in failing to anticipate the evolution of political power. By giving party leaders unchecked authority without establishing safeguards, the movement inadvertently created a system vulnerable to abuse. Aspirations that should flow through institutional channels are now blocked, forcing citizens to seek alternative outlets—emigration for the skilled elite, or street protests for the majority.
This disconnection has destabilizing consequences. A system without genuine opposition and without internal accountability risks devolving into oligarchic stagnation, where politics serves party elites rather than the people.
Toward Corrective Reforms
The current challenge is not to reset the system entirely but to update and correct its structural weaknesses. Urgent reforms include:
1. Political Party Reform – ensuring internal democracy and accountability within parties.
2. Political Governance Reform – restructuring candidate selection, competency requirements, and the efficiency of state administration.
3. Review of Economic Rents – revisiting the distribution of natural resource concessions.
4. Transparency of State Wealth – mandating disclosure of officials’ financial assets.
5. Separation of Politics and Business – preventing the fusion of ruling elites and economic interests.
6. Independent Law Enforcement – strengthening professionalism and autonomy of the judiciary and anti-corruption bodies.
7. Equitable Social Security – guaranteeing a fair social safety net for all citizens.
These reforms require not only political will but also intellectual leadership. Since the poor and marginalized lack the means to articulate systemic solutions, academics and public intellectuals must step forward to provide conceptual clarity and practical roadmaps.
Conclusion
The 1998 Reform Movement was a watershed moment that dismantled authoritarianism but failed to anticipate the rise of party oligarchies. By granting political parties unchecked power without accountability, reform leaders created a structural imbalance that now threatens democratic governance.
Indonesia does not need a wholesale reset, but it urgently needs a systematic update: one that restores the flow of popular aspirations, curbs the abuse of power by party elites, and reasserts the principle that democracy belongs to the people—not to political dynasties.
Only then can Reformasi fulfill its original promise. And only with divine guidance and collective will can Indonesia be saved from the trajectory of democratic decay.
